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Extant literature provides mixed evidence about whether managers preempt scheduled 
stock option grants with negative voluntary disclosures to reduce the strike price of the option 
(also known as “spring-loading” or “bullet-dodging”).  This study contributes to the literature by 
illustrating that the use and type of preemptive news disclosures (otherwise known as 
“expectation management”) depends on the timing of the grant relative to the earnings 
announcement.  Specifically, managers appear to disclose negative news prior to a scheduled 
option grant that occurs shortly before an earnings announcement but not when the grant occurs 
shortly after an earnings announcement.  I conjecture that managers are more likely to preempt a 
scheduled grant occurring after an earnings announcement with positive news, but find limited 
evidence to support this hypothesis.  Additionally, I demonstrate that the regulatory environment 
plays a role in the manager’s decision to engage in expectation management prior to a scheduled 
equity grant.  Managers appear to be more likely to use downward expectation management 
following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and less likely after 2006 SEC regulation 
increasing executive compensation disclosure. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Existing research (Huang and Lu 2010, among others) identifies three strategies through 
which managers can reduce the exercise or strike price of a stock option: (1) option backdating 
(Lie 2005), (2) opportunistic timing of an unscheduled option grant (Yermack 1997), and (3) 
opportunistic timing of information releases around a scheduled option grant (also referred to as 
“expectation management” in Aboody and Kasznik 2000).  Additionally, recent papers examine 
the effect that recent regulatory activity has had on managers’ ability or choice to engage in one 
of these three strategies.  Heron and Lie (2007) document that the use of the first strategy, option 
backdating, is greatly reduced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) while Huang and Lu 
(2010) provide evidence that the second strategy, the opportunistic timing of option grants, 
continues after SOX.  However, evidence pertaining to the third strategy, the opportunistic 
timing of news around earnings releases, is inconclusive.  While Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
document the use of downward expectation management prior to a fixed date stock option grant 
in the period 1992 - 1996, Huang and Lu (2010) argue that there is no evidence to support that 
conclusion in either the pre-SOX (1996 – August 28, 2002) or post-SOX (August 29, 2002 – 
2008) periods.  This study directly addresses the third strategy, providing evidence spanning the 
passage of SOX and the SEC’s 2006 amendments to Item 402 of Regulations S-K and S-B 
requiring more rigorous disclosure of executive compensation. 
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I argue that the timing of a scheduled stock price sensitive equity grant (SPSEG) relative 
to an earnings announcement date (EAD) is important to consider when investigating the 
existence of expectation management.1  I posit that when an equity grant occurs just before 
(after) an EAD, managers are more likely to engage in downward (upward) expectation 
management.  Without considering these opposing strategies, evidence of expectation 
management becomes confounded.   Therefore, my first research question is whether the timing 
of an SPSEG relative to the nearest earnings announcement date affects the type of information 
managers disclose prior to a predictable equity grant.    
Second, following Heron and Lie (2007) and Huang and Lu (2010), I ask whether the 
strategies managers use to effect a low strike price have changed in response to recent regulation.    
Specifically, I ask whether the use of expectation management has changed as managers’ ability 
to use backdating has diminished following SOX.   
Third, recently, the use of restricted stock as both a complement to and a substitute for 
stock option compensation has increased while the SEC has moved to increase the transparency 
associated with executive compensation.  My third research question addresses these issues 
jointly: do managers appear to be similarly incentivized by restricted stock grants in the more 
recent period and do the changes in disclosure requirements allow or incentivize managers to 
manage expectation in ways previously documented? 
To answer my first two research questions, I collect a sample of 355 predictable stock 
option grants occurring during 1992 – 2005.  Using each firm as its own control, I calculate 
analyst forecast revisions as a means to measure expectation management.  I compare the change 
in consensus forecast during SPSEG-granting quarters to same-firm firm-quarters with no equity 
                                                             
1 Scheduled stock price sensitive equity grants consist of both predictable stock option grants and predictable value-
based restricted stock grants.  I discuss the specifics in Section 2. 
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granting behavior and find that the use and direction of expectation management in SPSEG 
quarters depends on whether the grant occurs before or after the EAD.  Consistent with my 
expectation, I find evidence that analyst forecasts exhibit a steeper walk-down pattern (relative to 
the same firm’s other quarterly observations) when an SPSEG occurs shortly before an EAD. 
Additionally, I find evidence consistent with SOX affecting managers’ choice to engage in 
expectation management; managers are more likely to exhibit expectation management behavior 
in the period after SOX.  This is consistent with managers turning to expectation management 
after their ability to use backdating is reduced.  Alternatively, results of the main tests do not 
provide evidence that managers guide analyst forecasts incrementally upward or downward 
(relative to non-equity granting quarters) when the SPSEG occurs shortly after an earnings 
announcement in either the pre- or post-SOX periods. 
To answer my third research question, I run similar analyses for 201 stock option and 
restricted stock grants occurring between 2006 and 2010.   I find no evidence consistent with 
either steeper or attenuated expectation management prior to an equity grant occurring before or 
after an EAD.  This could suggest that the increased disclosure requirements related to executive 
compensation have affected managers’ ability or desire to engage in “bullet-dodging” or “spring-
loading.”2  Alternatively, restricted stock grants may provide incentives similar to stock options 
but my tests lack the power to demonstrate the effect. 
 This study provides three primary contributions to the literature.  First, I provide more 
clarity on whether managers appear to engage in expectation management around scheduled 
equity grants. I find evidence that the use and direction of expectation management differs 
                                                             
2 “Spring-loading” is generally defined as withholding positive news until after an option grant has been awarded 
while “bullet-dodging” is the practice of awarding stock options after negative news has been disclosed.  In the 
business press “spring-loading” is often used to describe both practices.    
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depending on the relative timing of the equity grant to the EAD.  Second, I investigate the link 
between recent regulatory activity and managers’ choice to engage in expectation management 
around scheduled equity grants.  I document changes in the use of expectation management in 
the periods before and after SOX and after recent SEC regulation concerning executive 
compensation.  This information should be of interest to regulators as they gauge the 
effectiveness of the existing disclosure requirements and consider alternatives.  Third, most 
studies in this stream of literature focus on stock option grants.  However, the use of restricted 
stocks in CEO compensation contracts is increasing and the method used to determine the 
number of restricted stocks granted is becoming progressively more sensitive to the market price 
of the stock on the grant date.  The inclusion of these restricted stock grants increases the 
relevance and timeliness of the results.   
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides background 
and a literature review; chapter 3 develops the hypotheses; chapter 4 provides the sample 
selection and research design; chapter 5 provides the empirical results; chapter 6 discusses 
sensitivity tests; chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions; and, chapter 8 provides a detailed list of 
variables.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Equity continues to be an important component of CEO remuneration packages.    
Compensation consultants report as recently as 2010 that stock options are the most widely-used 
form of equity compensation in long-term incentive plans; however, the mix of equity awards is 
increasingly favoring restricted stock.3,4  Restricted stock awards that are granted based on a 
target value as opposed to a set number of shares are likely to induce similar incentives as stock 
options because the future value to the CEO is not only increasing in the future stock price of the 
firm’s shares but also decreasing in the exercise or market price on the date of the grant.5  
Therefore, CEOs may be incentivized to achieve the lowest stock price possible on these equity 
grant dates to maximize their compensation. 
Despite the obvious costs to manipulating a firm’s share price (e.g., potential shareholder 
lawsuits, loss of employment, reduced value of held equity), prior literature has uncovered 
evidence consistent with managers temporarily guiding their firms’ share price down prior to a 
                                                             
3 Culpepper and Associates 2010 survey results: 
http://www.culpepper.com/eBulletin/2010/USEquityCompLTIPractices.asp. 
 
4 Equilar’s 2011 Equity Trends Report indicates that S&P 1500 firms have reduced the use of stock option grants by 
3.8 percent annually from 2006 to 2010 while the use of restricted stock has grown from 74.9 to 89.9 percent in the 
same time period. 
 http://www.equilar.com/knowledge-network/research-reports/2011-research-reports    
/Equity-Trends-Report-2011-Update.php 
 
5 The National Association of Stock Plan Professionals Survey finds that the number of firms using a target value to 
award restricted stocks grew from 19% in 2004 to 63% in 2007. 
http://www.thoughtcentric.com/resource/resmgr/webinars/restricted_stock_rsus_ps_for.pdf 
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stock option grant.6  Short of backdating (Lie 2005), managers may achieve a low stock price 
prior to an equity grant in two ways: manipulating the equity grant date around a given negative 
information release or manipulating information releases around a given grant date.7  In the first 
case, the board grants an unscheduled option award on a day when the stock price is depressed, 
likely due to management disclosure of “bad” news.  In the second case, management 
opportunistically preempts or delays news (depending on the type the news) around a scheduled 
grant date.  
The nature of the second method is different from that of the first because “fixed date” 
grants should be predictable to some degree to management, researchers, and the market, 
including analysts.  Nevertheless, Aboody and Kasznik (2000, AK hereafter) provide evidence 
consistent with managers opportunistically timing voluntary disclosures around fixed date stock 
option grants in their sample period 1992 - 1996; they find significantly negative abnormal 
returns prior to and significantly positive abnormal returns after the fixed date stock option grant.  
Similarly, a stream of prior research (e.g., Baker et al. 2003; Balsam et al. 2003; Coles et al. 
2006; McAnally et al. 2008) shows that managers engage in income-decreasing accrual 
management prior to a stock option grant or re-issue.   
However, a recent study by Huang and Lu (2010, HL hereafter) revisits opportunistically-
timed disclosures over the period 1996 – 2008 and concludes that there is no evidence of this 
strategy in this more recent sample period.  Since the AK and HL studies only overlap in one 
year (1996), the two studies may not be contradictory if the results in AK are reflective of 
                                                             
6 Opportunistic behavior is not necessarily indicative of a failure in compensation contracting.  As Yermack (1997) 
suggests, it is possible that boards anticipate this form of manipulation and adjust the remainder of the compensation 
contract accordingly.   
 
7 Backdating entails choosing a grant date with a historically low stock price but does not involve a direct 
manipulation of the stock price. 
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managerial actions taking place in the earlier part of their sample.  However, it is also possible 
that research design choices in HL cause the potential discrepancy.  HL define non-backdated, 
scheduled option grants as those that occur within one day of the one year anniversary of a prior 
grant and also those that do not occur on the date with the lowest stock price of the month.  To 
the extent that managers may schedule their information disclosures to allow for a stock to 
achieve the lowest price on the date of the grant, their definition of scheduled grants likely 
reduces the power of their hypothesis tests because they remove the observations that would 
likely provide the evidence they hypothesize. 
Additionally, HL gauge expectation management by comparing stock returns from the 30 
days prior to a grant with the returns from the 30 days after a grant.  As mentioned above, the 
nature of information disclosures to manage expectations should differ depending on the timing 
of the grant date relative to the EAD.  I explain this difference in more detail in Section 3, but for 
now argue that combining the two effects likely biases against finding expectation management.    
I examine analyst forecast patterns in the periods around an SPSEG assuming that the 
patterns provide joint evidence of both managers’ intent to manipulate stock price prior to an 
equity grant and analysts’ decision to assign value to managers’ disclosures around an SPSEG.   
While the prior literature generally examines stock returns around an SPSEG, returns may 
capture information that analysts may choose not to incorporate into their forecasts for 
reputational reasons (i.e., managers’ disclosures of bad news prior to a stock option grant).  On 
the other hand, analysts may incorporate information into their forecast revisions that may not be 
fully priced by the market if investors are aware of managerial incentives around an SPSEG.  In 
both cases, the mapping between forecast revisions and returns may be incomplete. I therefore 
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focus my research design on analyst forecasts as a more direct measure of managerial 
disclosures.8 
  
                                                             
8 Another option would be to examine manager disclosures; however, to the extent that we cannot capture every 
managerial disclosure, this alternative data source could also provide noisy evidence.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Scheduled or “fixed date” CEO equity grants are those that occur at approximately the 
same time every year.  The predetermined grant date allows managers to time their disclosures 
such that the option strike price or market price is minimized.  However, as discussed below, the 
method used to minimize the stock price at the grant date may be different depending on whether 
the grant date occurs shortly before or after an earnings announcement.   
AK discover that 20.6% of fixed date stock option grants in their sample occur in the two 
weeks subsequent to the EAD and 16.7% occur in the two weeks prior to the EAD.  They 
postulate that the relative timing of the predictable stock option grant and EAD is important; 
however, they only investigate the implications of managerial actions to reduce the share price 
when the predictable stock option grant precedes the EAD.  They discount the possibility of 
expectation management when the EAD precedes the stock option grant (p.75): 
 “Because managers likely have more private information shortly before earnings 
announcements than shortly thereafter, we conjecture that CEOs who receive their options 
immediately before earnings announcements have greater opportunities to adopt a voluntary 
disclosure strategy that maximizes the value of their awards.” 
Additionally, AK investigate stock returns but not analyst forecasts in light of this 
relative timing.  This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps in the literature.   
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3.1  SPSEG precedes Earnings Announcement  
When the SPSEG date occurs in the period prior to the earnings announcement date, 
managers may voluntarily disclose bad news prior to the grant date in order to decrease the stock 
price.  AK find evidence consistent with this prediction: in their sample, the cumulative 
abnormal returns are significantly negative in the period prior to the grant date when the grant 
date precedes the EAD. This is similar to the “walk-down” pattern described in Richardson, 
Teoh, and Wysocki (2004) in which managers disclose negative information during the forecast 
period in order to reduce the analyst consensus forecast later in the period.  However, in the 
context of an SPSEG preceding an EAD, managers are likely incentivized to both beat the 
consensus forecast at the EAD and to achieve a lower stock price before the SPSEG.   
Change in walk-down pattern 
The “walk-down” is generally examined in the context of analyst ex post optimism and 
pessimism over the forecast horizon.  The general pattern includes optimistic forecasts in the 
long horizon, switching to pessimistic forecasts as the EAD approaches, allowing managers to 
achieve small positive earnings surprises (See Figure 1, Panel A). 9   Richardson, Teoh and 
Wysocki (2004) report a median forecast error of one cent at the EAD which is consistent with 
analysts’ incentives to engage in the walk-down being tempered by other motivations, such as 
the desire to produce accurate forecasts.10  To simplify the hypotheses, I assume these incentives 
are unchanged in my setting.   
I provide the following example to illustrate how the walk-down pattern may differ 
around an SPSEG.  Suppose Firm A has no equity granting activity in quarter q.  The initial 
                                                             
9 Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) find that the switch between optimistic and pessimistic quarterly forecasts 
happens between four and six weeks prior to the earnings announcement date in the sample period 1992 – 2001.  
 
10 In other words, if an analyst’s only motivation is to provide beatable forecasts, larger positive earnings surprises 
would likely be more common.   
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Figure 1 
 Forecast Revision Patterns 
 
 
 
Panel A: General Walk-down pattern
positive earnings surprise
Optimistic initial forecasts and pessimistic revisions allow managers to achieve a 
positive earnings surprise at the earnings announcement date (EAD).
Panel B: SPSEG occurs shortly before  Earnings Announcement Date
Optimistic initial forecasts and pessimistic revisions occur prior to the SPSEG.
The slope of the revision line should be significantly more negative. 
Panel C: SPSEG occurs shortly after  Earnings Announcement Date
negative earnings surprise
Optimistic forecasts and less pessimistic revisions occur prior to the EAD
allowing for a negative earnings surprise at the EAD.
Dashed line represents the forecast revision pattern.
Solid line reflects the ex post  realization of earnings.
actual earnings
q-1 q-1 EAD q q EAD
      SPSEG
actual earnings
actual earnings
q-1 q-1 EAD q q EAD
        positive earnings surprise
q-1 q-1 EAD q q EAD
      SPSEG
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consensus forecast for Firm A for quarter q is $0.13.  The consensus forecast drops to $0.12 in 
the middle of the forecasting period and to $0.10 at the end of the forecasting period just prior to 
the quarterly earnings announcement.  Actual earnings are revealed to be $0.11.  In this example, 
the initial forecast is optimistic but the final consensus allows the manager to beat the consensus.  
Overall, the revision is ($0.10 – 0.13) = -$0.03.   
In another quarter Firm A has an SPSEG prior to the EAD (Figure 1, Panel B).  Analyst 
incentives are held constant such that there is no change in the final forecast error.  The only 
change in incentives in this scenario is that management prefers all of the downward forecast 
revisions (-$0.03) to occur prior to the SPSEG, instead of prior to the EAD.  The length of time 
in which analysts have to revise their forecasts is shortened (by design, in this setting the SPSEG 
occurs shortly before the EAD).  Therefore, in order for analysts and managers to balance the 
same incentives, it must be the case that the slope of the walk-down is steeper prior to the 
SPSEG11,12   I posit the first hypothesis in alternate form:   
Hypothesis 1: When an SPSEG occurs shortly before an earnings announcement, the 
analyst forecast revision pattern is more negatively-sloping prior to the 
SPSEG than it is in other same-firm firm-quarters in which an equity grant 
does not occur, ceteris paribus.   
 
3.2  Earnings Announcement precedes SPSEG 
When the SPSEG occurs shortly after the EAD (Figure 1, Panel C) a manager’s preferred 
expectation path likely runs counter to the walk-down pattern discussed above.  In order to 
obtain the lowest stock price just prior to the equity grant, management should prefer to have a  
                                                             
11 It may also be the case that analysts are willing to issue even more negative forecast revisions prior to the SPSEG 
and revise those forecasts upward between the SPSEG and EAD; however, prior research shows analyst forecast 
revisions are serially correlated (i.e., Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). 
 
12 The predictability of the equity grant may have a moderating effect: analysts may choose to refrain from engaging 
in a steeper walk-down due to the fact that managerial intentions may be easier to infer and analysts may face 
reputational repercussions.  I discuss this further in chapter 7. 
13 
 
negative earnings surprise at the EAD.  McAnally et al. (2008) find that the likelihood of an 
earnings “miss” as a result of downward earnings management is increasing in the existence of a 
predictable stock option grant, but they do not study the expectation path that results in a 
negative earnings surprise.  I suggest that managers may choose to use expectation management 
to achieve this end, especially if they are limited in their ability to use income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals.  As a result, I posit that managers withhold negative news or disclose 
positive news prior to an EAD in order to achieve a negative earnings surprise at the EAD.  
Holding all other analyst incentives steady, I expect the walk-down path to be less downward-
sloping or even upward-sloping when the EAD precedes the SPSEG (Figure 1, Panel C).  The 
corresponding hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: When an SPSEG occurs shortly after an earnings announcement, the 
analyst forecast revision pattern is less negatively-sloping than it is in 
other same-firm firm-quarters in which an equity grant does not occur, 
ceteris paribus.   
 
3.3  Regulatory environment and the Jell-O Effect 
Kayla Gillan, a founding member of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) and one-time general counsel of CalPers, used a Jell-O-related analogy to describe the 
effect of regulation on compensation practices.  Gillan stated that the regulation of executive 
compensation practices is “akin to pushing a ball of Jell-O uphill.  [As you] push… the Jell-O in 
one spot, it simply squirts out in another.” 13   Her comments reflect the observed shift in 
compensation practices as regulations are enacted.  Substantiating this point, Kaiser (2007) notes 
that following the 1993 regulation (Internal Revenue Code section 162(M)) limiting the 
deductibility of non-performance-related compensation, firms shifted compensation toward more 
                                                             
13 Written testimony of Kayla J. Gillan, Former Founding Member of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, June 3, 2008. 
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performance based measures.  Similarly, following the implementation of SFAS 123R in 2004, 
which requires the expensing of stock options, many firms changed the structure of their equity 
compensation to include more restricted stock.   
I ask whether this phenomenon affects managers’ choice to engage in expectation 
management over my sample period.  Heron and Lie (2007) find that following the enactment of 
SOX, which required the disclosure of insider transactions within two days, the ability of 
managers to engage in backdating was drastically reduced.  It seems plausible that as managers 
are less able to effect a low strike price via backdating they might engage in more “spring-
loading.”  On the other hand, recent SEC regulation may reduce managerial incentives to engage 
in “spring-loading.”  In 2006, the SEC adopted amendments to Item 402 of Regulations S-K and 
S-B that require additional quantitative and qualitative disclosure with respect to equity 
compensation. 14 Among the requirements are additional disclosures describing the timing of 
options.  For example, firms need to consider the following question when preparing their 
compensation disclosure: 
“Does a company have any program, plan or practice to time option grants to its 
executives in coordination with the release of material non-public information?” 15   
Kaiser (2007) notes that the regulation does not render “spring-loading” illegal but that the 
resulting transparency may serve to deter it.  I therefore hypothesize that changes in the 
regulatory environment are likely to play a role in managers’ use of expectations management 
leading up to an SPSEG.  
 
                                                             
14 Calendar year firms’ proxy statements were required to reflect these changes for the 2006 fiscal year. 
 
15 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf 
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I posit the third hypothesis in the null: 
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference in analyst forecast revision patterns around an 
SPSEG in the pre-SOX, post-SOX/pre-2006 and post-2005 periods, ceteris 
paribus. 
  
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1  Sample Selection 
I begin by identifying firms with an SPSEG. Since 1992 was the first year firms were 
required to disclose stock option grants, I restrict my sample to firms with equity grants in the 
years 1992 through 2010, inclusive.  Due to differences in data availability in the pre-2006 and 
post-2005 periods as a result of the SEC’s changes in disclosure requirements, I separate my 
sample into the two sample periods.  For the pre-2006 period, I focus on firms with predictable 
stock option grants only.  In the post-2006 period I look at firms with both predictable stock 
option grants and predictable restricted stock grants. 
4.1.1 Pre-2006 
As described in Table 1, Panel A, 21,267 CEO stock option grant awards are listed in 
Execucomp from 1992 - 2005.16,17  I follow a procedure similar to Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
in order to obtain a sample of “fixed” or scheduled stock option grants.  I remove options granted 
by utility and financial firms and those belonging to firms that have only one stock option grant  
  
                                                             
16 Similar to AK, I remove reload options from the sample. 
 
17 Data for grants occurring 1992-2005 are from Execucomp’s “Stock Option Grants – 1992 Format” database. 
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Table 1 
Stock Option Grant Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: CEO Stock Option Grant Sample Grants 
 
Firms 
    CEO Stock Option Grant Data From Execucomp  1992 -   
2005 21,267 
 
2,578 
Less: 
        Firm having less than two CEO grants in sample period 212 
 
212 
     Financial and regulated utility firms 3,716 
 
471 
     Firms not covered by CRSP or I/B/E/S 963 
 
107 
Remaining SPSEG 16,376 
 
1,788 
Less: 
        Missing grant date 69 
 
2 
     Multiple grants on the same date 1,529 
 
0 
Grants remaining to random sample 14,778 
 
1,786 
     Grants eliminated due to lack of accurate date information 3,618  55 
Grants remaining in sample after random sampling 11,160  1,731 
    
 
Prior to 
 
After 
Panel B: Random Sampling 
random 
sampling 
 
random 
sampling 
    Exercise price matched CRSP price on assumed grant date 8,397 
 
11,160 
Exercise price does NOT match CRSP price on assumed 
grant date 7,979 
 
3,618 
Total 16,376 
 
14,778 
    % of sample where assumed date is considered correct 51.3% 
 
75.5% 
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(in order to identify firms with predictable option grants).18  Additionally, I remove all options 
for firms not covered by CRSP and I/B/E/S.  16,376 stock option grants pertaining to 1,788 firms 
remain.   
Since my hypotheses are dependent on the timing of the grant relative to the earnings 
announcement dates, I take care to verify the option grant date.  During this time period firms 
reported the expiration date of stock option grants and the exercise price of the grants.  I use this 
information to infer the grant date.  Stock options often expire on the anniversary of their grant 
date; therefore, if a grant is listed as expiring on a certain date in a future year, it is likely that the 
grant date occurred on same date in the current year.  After generating the inferred grant dates, I 
compare the option exercise price as listed in Execucomp to the stock price in CRSP to verify 
that the inferred grant date is correct.  
I consider the price a “match” (and therefore, the grant date correct) if the exercise price 
from Execucomp (“exprc”) equals the price (“prc”), the closing ask (“ask”), the closing bid 
(“bid”), the bid or low (“bidlo”), the ask or high (“askhi”), the open price (“open”), the average 
of the closing bid and closing ask prices ((“bid” + “ask”)/2), or the average of the bid or low and 
ask or high ((“bidlo + “askhi”)/2) prices from CRSP.  Additionally, if the exercise price falls  
within the range of the askhi and bidlo, I consider it a match.19  If the stock has split, I consider 
the price a “match” if the rounded split-adjusted price matches the CRSP price.   
 
                                                             
18 I remove utility and financial firms because I use a measure of earnings management in the multivariate analyses. 
The regulatory environment in those industries substantially changes the incentives associated with managing 
earnings. 
 
19 This measure is noisy, especially for observations with low stock price volatility. This biases against finding 
results.  
 
19 
 
As detailed in Table 1, Panel B, of the 16,376 grants, I find 8,397, or 51.3% have exercise 
prices that match the CRSP price on the inferred grant date. Following the initial matching 
process, I use a random number generator to choose a sample of grants to compare to the proxy 
statements or Form 4’s for validation.  I include all grants (even those identified as a “match”) in 
the randomization process.  For each randomly-chosen observation I look for the proxy 
statements associated with all unmatched grants in the sample belonging to that firm.  In many 
cases there is no further information in the proxy statement to indicate the specific grant date of 
the stock option.  After making changes to the grant dates based on corporate documents, 
removing multiple grants occurring on the same day, and eliminating grants with no grant dates, 
the percentage matched increases to 75.5%.20,21  The remaining 3,618 unmatched grants are 
removed from further analysis.22   
Next, I determine whether a stock option grant is considered fixed.  If the grant date 
occurs within 358 to 372 days of a subsequent or prior grant I consider the grant fixed or 
predictable.   For a firm that has unscheduled grants, I remove the first unscheduled grant and all 
grants following.   Therefore, I only include firm grants that occur during the period in which the 
firm only appears to be granting predictable awards.23   
                                                             
20 The majority of changed dates pertain to having an incorrect year in the assumed date. 
 
21 Of the unmatched grants, 940 were included in the random sample.  I could find no documentation to either verify 
the grant date or to explain the difference between the stock price in CRSP and the exercise price.  
 
22 As discussed later, I use all remaining same-firm firm quarters in which no equity activity occurs as the control 
group for my tests.  Because I am unable to verify the grant dates for the 3,618 grants, they will be included in the 
control group.  This biases against finding results.  One strategy would be to remove those firms from the sample 
entirely, but sample size becomes a limitation. 
 
23 AK eliminate all firm observations for firms that grant any unscheduled grants arguing that the firm is of a 
different type if it grants unscheduled grants.  I argue that the firm type only changes once it begins granting 
unscheduled grants.  
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I then establish whether the earnings announcement and option grant occur close enough 
together to be included in my sample of “treatment” observations.24  I consider an observation a 
“treatment” observation if the SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to or after an EAD (as 
reported in I/B/E/S).25  After eliminating grants for any of the above criteria, I remove any firm 
that no longer has any option grants in the sample or that has less than two firm-quarter 
observations remaining in the sample.  I remove all observations that are missing the necessary 
information to generate the control variables, firm-quarters in which the stock price is less than 
$1, and firm-quarters with a loss.26,27  I segregate the remaining SPSEG-granting quarters into 
two distinct samples: firm-quarters with an SPSEG prior to an EAD (“Before” grants) and firm-
quarters with an EAD prior to an SPSEG (“After” grants).28   
4.1.2 Post-2005 
I follow a similar procedure to obtain a list of firms with predictable equity grants during 
the period 2006-2010.  In this time period, I am able to directly collect the dates of stock or 
option awards from Execucomp and do not perform any additional analyses to verify the grant 
                                                             
24 Following AK, I choose this research design to allow for clearer inferences about managerial incentives.  
 
25 I choose these cutoff dates to allow a grant to be associated with only one quarterly period.  Since the time 
between quarterly earnings announcement days is generally close to 90 days, I choose time frames that should not 
overlap.  I vary this time frame in the sensitivity testing in chapter 6. 
 
26 I remove loss firm-quarter observations to reduce the noise associated with analysts’ resistance to forecasting 
losses (McNichols and O’Brien 1997).   
 
27 Inferences are generally similar if I include the loss firm-quarters and include a dummy variable, Loss. 
Differences in significance levels of the SPSEG measure occur in columns (6), (7) and (9) on Table 8, Panel A.  The 
SPSEG measures become significantly negative, insignificant, and significantly negative in columns (6), (7) and (9), 
respectively.  In Table 9 Panel B, the SPSEG measure in column (1) becomes significantly negative, which is 
counter to expectation.  
 
28 The number of grants remaining in the sample according to Table 1 is larger than the number of grants 
summarized in Tables 2 and 3 and in all subsequent regression analyses.  The reason is that once I split the sample 
into “Before” and “After” samples, I again remove any firm observations that have less than two observations per 
firm and that are missing data to generate the control variables.  Table 1 is intended to show how many observations 
are lost due to a mismatch between the price on the “assumed” grant date and the CRSP price on that date.  Note that 
this loss of observations does not occur in the post-2006 sample because the grant date is provided in Execucomp. 
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dates.29  I follow similar procedures to determine if the grants are predictable and occurring 
within 30 days of an earnings announcement.30   
4.2  Testing hypothesis 1 (Equity Grant before EAD): 
To test H1, I retain only the firm-quarter observations in which the SPSEG precedes an 
EAD and all other same-firm firm-quarters in which no grant activity had been identified (i.e., if 
a firm also has firm-quarters in which an SPSEG occurs after an EAD, those firm-quarters are 
dropped when testing H1).  Using the “treatment” quarters (quarters with an SPSEG), I calculate 
the median number of days between the SPSEG and the EAD for each firm.  I subtract the 
median number of days from the EAD for the firm’s control observations to obtain a quasi-
SPSEG date.  The purpose of this research design choice is to ensure that the forecast revision is 
measured over the same forecast horizon for each firm’s control and treatment quarterly 
observations.   
Additionally, I split each quarter into monthly periods.  “Month 0” begins 30 days before 
and ends one day before the current quarterly earnings announcement date.  “Month – 3”, 
“Month – 2”, and “Month – 1” are the months beginning 120, 90, and 60 days prior to the current 
quarterly earnings announcement, respectively, and ending 30 days later.  I allow for a “Month -
3” for firms in which the prior quarter’s earnings announcement is more than 90 days prior to the 
current quarterly earnings announcement.  I group analyst forecasts for firm i and quarter q into 
monthly groups to calculate the consensus monthly forecast.  I eliminate any forecasts that occur 
prior to or on the prior quarter’s earnings announcement date and those occurring on or after the 
current quarter’s earnings announcement date. 
                                                             
29 Data for grants occurring 2006 – 2010 are from Execucomp’s “Plan Based Awards” database. 
 
30 I compare the “matched” or verified 2005 grant dates to the 2006 grant dates to determine if the 2006 grants are 
predictable. 
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I calculate the forecast revision by subtracting the earliest monthly analyst consensus 
from the latest monthly consensus for each firm-quarter.  I remove firm-quarters in which the 
earliest and latest available forecast months are the same.  I scale the forecast revision by the 
price listed in the CRSP monthly file for the month of the prior quarter’s earnings announcement.     
I run the following regression for all firm-quarter observations (both control and 
treatment observations) for firms that have an SPSEG prior to an EAD in the sample period.  I 
use each firm as its own control and therefore run the model using firm fixed effects.  I exclude 
subscripts for readability.   
𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1SPSEGMeasure + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀        (1)31  
where: 
FCRev = (FCrevised-FCinitial/Priceq-1)*100 
SPSEG Measure   
       SPSEG = one for firm-quarters in which a predictable stock 
option grant occurs within the 30 days prior to the 
EADq in the pre-2006 period, zero otherwise. 
       Either = one for firm-quarters in which a predictable stock 
option grant or predictable restricted stock grant occurs 
within the 30 days prior to the EADq in the post-2005 
period, zero otherwise. 
       Value = Black-Scholes value of the SPSEG scaled by CEO 
salary for firm i in year t. 
 
                                                             
31 A detailed list of variables is included in chapter 8. 
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       Biggest = one if the SPSEG has the largest Value for firm i during 
the sub-sample period, zero otherwise. 
TotAssets = Log (total assetsq) 
ChEPS = (EPSq-EPSq-4)/Priceq-1 
Volatility = Standard deviation (EPSq)/ Mean(EPSq) over the past 
five quarters 
 
 I use three SPSEG measures to capture the potentially nuanced effect of an SPSEG.  
First, for tests related to the pre-2006 sample, SPSEG is defined as an indicator variable equal to 
one when a predictable stock option grant occurs in the 30 days prior to an EAD.  This measure 
captures the difference in analyst forecast revision when a predictable stock option grant of any 
size occurs in the period before an EAD relative to a same-firm firm-quarter with no equity-
granting activity.  Second, Value captures the relationship between the relative value of the stock 
option grant and the forecast revision.  Third, Biggest is an indicator variable equal to one when 
the SPSEG is the largest SPSEG for a given firm in the sample period.  For the regressions using 
Biggest I remove all other SPSEG quarters in order to compare only the effect of the arguably 
most important SPSEG against non-equity granting quarters.  If management provides more 
negative information to analysts prior to an SPSEG and analysts respond accordingly, I expect 
the coefficient on the SPSEG measures to be negative, reflecting a steeper walk-down.    
In the post-2005 period, I define the SPSEG measures similarly, however, in place of the 
indicator variable SPSEG, I substitute the indicator variable Either to reflect the existence of 
either a predictable stock option grant or predictable restricted stock grant.  Value reflects the 
Black-Scholes value of the stock option grant or restricted stock grant and Biggest is equal to one 
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when the Value of either the stock option grant or restricted stock grant is the largest in the sub-
sample period. 
Following AK, I include TotAssets and Volatility to control for analyst bias that has been 
documented to exist for small firms with low earnings predictability.  I expect the coefficient on 
TotAssets to be negative to reflect an optimistic bias for small firms while I expect the coefficient 
on Volatility to be positive, reflecting the optimistic bias for more volatile firms.  Additionally, I 
include ChEPS following both AK and Matsumoto (2002) to control for an unexpected change in 
earnings and expect the relationship to be positive.  
4.3  Testing hypothesis 2 (Equity Grant after EAD): 
 I follow a similar procedure to test H2 with the sample firms that have a predictable 
equity grant occurring after an EAD.  However, in this case, I allow the latest forecast revision to 
occur up until the day before the EAD.  I expect the coefficient on the SPSEG measure to be 
positive, reflecting a reduction in downward forecast revisions in “After” treatment quarters 
relative to control quarters.  I use the following regression equation to test H2: 
𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1SPSEGMeasure + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠_𝐿 +
𝛽6𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥_𝐿 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑀 + 𝜀     (2) 
where the variables are as previously defined and:32 
Bonus_L = CEO bonus for firm i for year t+1/ CEO salary for 
firm i for year t 
OptEx_L = Value of CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1/ 
                                                             
32 As described previously, I use three measures of SPSEG in the pre-2006 sample: SPSEG, Value, and Biggest 
where SPSEG is equal to one for firm-quarters with predictable stock option grants.  In the post-2005 sample the 
SPSEG measures are: Either, Value and Biggest where Either is equal to one for firm-quarters with predictable stock 
option grants or predictable restricted stock grants. 
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CEO salary for firm i for year t 
StockHeld = Log(value of stock held by the CEO of firm i in year t/ 
CEO salary in year t) 
EM = Quartile of earnings management measure 
 
 I include additional control variables for the “After” sample to reflect managers’ likely 
competing incentives.  As mentioned earlier, I expect managers to be more likely to miss an 
earnings benchmark when an equity grant occurs shortly after the announcement, as found in 
McAnally et al. (2008).  However, this strategy is likely to be more costly to managers in the 
form of lost future bonuses and a reduction in value of the executive’s held equity.  Following 
McAnally et al. (2008), I include the measures Bonus_L, the value of year t+1 bonus scaled by 
the salary for year t, OptEx_L, the value of the options exercised in year t+1 scaled by salary for 
year t, and StockHeld, the value of the equity held, excluding options, scaled by salary in year t 
to control for these competing incentives.  I expect the coefficients on Bonus_L, OptEx_L and 
StockHeld to be negative to reflect managerial incentives to meet or beat earnings expectations in 
periods in which there is no SPSEG occurring shortly after the EAD.  
 McAnally et al. (2008) find that managers appear to use downward accruals management 
in the quarter prior to a large fixed date stock option grant. I include a measure to control for a 
manager’s choice to use earnings management in addition to or instead of expectation 
management.  I define the measure EM as a relative measure of discretionary accruals calculated 
using the Jones Model (1991).  I run the following model for each fiscal year and quarter by two-
digit SIC code. 
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I apply the estimated coefficients to each firm-quarter observation to arrive at a predicted level of 
accruals.  I subtract the predicted accruals from each firm-quarter level of accruals to arrive at an 
estimated amount of discretionary accruals.  I break each fiscal year-quarter into quintiles based 
on the amount of discretionary accruals for each firm.  I assign a relative measure of earnings 
management (EM) to each firm-quarter based on a scale in which a value of “5” represents firm-
quarters exhibiting the highest positive quartile of discretionary accruals and “1” represents firm-
quarters with the lowest level.  I do not place an expectation on the EM variable because the use 
of earnings management in a non-equity granting quarter may reflect a variety of incentives 
which are not unidirectional (smoothing, generating cookie jar reserves, etc.). 
4.4  Testing hypothesis 3: 
 I run each regression analysis separately for the three time periods defined as: (1) 1992-
SOX, (2) SOX-2005, and (3) 2006-2010 and compare the coefficients of interest across periods. 
  
                                                             
33 As in prior literature, total assets in this equation are not taken as the log.  Therefore, the notation is different than 
the notation for total assets (TotAssets) in equations 1 and 2. 
 
TA = Total Accruals 
A = Total Assets33 
ΔREV = Change in revenue 
PPE = Property, Plant and Equipment 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1  Grant Distribution – pre-2006 
5.1.1 “Before” sample34 
As listed in Table 2, Panels A and B, 189 scheduled grants belonging to 97 firms occur 
within the 30 days prior to an earnings announcement.  Panel A provides the distribution of  
grants by year and month.  The distribution is skewed toward the earlier period in the sample. 
This is likely due to the fact that the longer a firm is in the sample, the more likely it is to have an 
unscheduled grant, after which all firm grants are excluded from the sample.  The monthly 
distribution generally follows that in prior literature; as in HL, the majority of grants occur near 
the beginning of the calendar year, with the exception of a large number of grants in July.35  The 
grants are spread over a variety of industries with the chemical (SIC 28) and electrical industries 
(SIC 36) being over-represented in the sample, consistent with Smith and Watts’ (1992) 
observation that high growth industries are more likely to use equity-based compensation.  
Approximately 79% of the firms in this sample have calendar year-ends.   
                                                             
34 For clarification, I refer to both the firm-quarters with an equity grant occurring before (after) an EAD and the 
corresponding control firm-quarters as the “Before” (“After”) sample.  This is not to be confused with the time 
period.  I refer to the period before 2006 as the “Pre-2006” period and the subsequent period as the “Post-2005” 
period.   
 
35 I provide detail on the monthly distribution of grants to compare to previous studies and also to provide evidence 
to support fiscal quarter-specific robustness tests.  Since the majority of the firms in the study have calendar year-
ends, the calendar month is generally informative. 
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Table 2 
SPSEG Distribution - pre-2006 Sample 
Panel A: “Before” Sample Distribution of Fixed Date Stock Option Grant Dates by 
Calendar Year and Month 
 
        
 
Year Freq. Percent 
 
Month Freq. Percent 
 
1993 6 3.17% 
 
1 74 39.15% 
 
1994 32 16.93% 
 
2 14 7.41% 
 
1995 28 14.81% 
 
3 17 8.99% 
 
1996 21 11.11% 
 
4 18 9.52% 
 
1997 13 6.88% 
 
5 3 1.59% 
 
1998 13 6.88% 
 
6 7 3.70% 
 
1999 14 7.41% 
 
7 36 19.05% 
 
2000 15 7.94% 
 
8 2 1.06% 
 
2001 8 4.23% 
 
9 5 2.65% 
 
2002 10 5.29% 
 
10 6 3.17% 
 
2003 7 3.70% 
 
11 2 1.06% 
 
2004 12 6.35% 
 
12 5 2.65% 
 
2005 10 5.29% 
  
189 100.00% 
  
189 100.00% 
    
        Panel B: “Before” Sample Distribution of firms 
by Two Digit SIC 
    
        
 
Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
 
Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
 
10 1 1.03% 
 
37 6 6.19% 
 
12 1 1.03% 
 
38 7 7.22% 
 
13 4 4.12% 
 
40 2 2.06% 
 
15 2 2.06% 
 
41 1 1.03% 
 
20 1 1.03% 
 
42 1 1.03% 
 
23 1 1.03% 
 
44 1 1.03% 
 
26 5 5.15% 
 
45 2 2.06% 
 
27 2 2.06% 
 
48 2 2.06% 
 
28 11 11.34% 
 
50 1 1.03% 
 
29 3 3.09% 
 
53 1 1.03% 
 
30 3 3.09% 
 
56 1 1.03% 
 
32 1 1.03% 
 
58 3 3.09% 
 
33 3 3.09% 
 
59 2 2.06% 
 
34 1 1.03% 
 
73 5 5.15% 
 
35 7 7.22% 
 
79 1 1.03% 
 
36 14 14.43% 
 
87 1 1.03% 
      
97 100.00% 
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Table 2 
SPSEG Distribution - pre-2006 Sample 
Panel C: “After” Sample Distribution of Fixed Date Stock Option Grant Dates by Calendar Year 
and Month 
        
 
Year Freq. Percent 
 
Month Freq. Percent 
 
1993 11 6.63% 
 
1 16 9.64% 
 
1994 29 17.47% 
 
2 49 29.52% 
 
1995 21 12.65% 
 
3 13 7.83% 
 
1996 21 12.65% 
 
4 19 11.45% 
 
1997 23 13.86% 
 
5 24 14.46% 
 
1998 18 10.84% 
 
6 6 3.61% 
 
1999 14 8.43% 
 
7 9 5.42% 
 
2000 9 5.42% 
 
8 7 4.22% 
 
2001 1 0.60% 
 
9 2 1.20% 
 
2002 3 1.81% 
 
10 11 6.63% 
 
2003 6 3.61% 
 
11 8 4.82% 
 
2004 5 3.01% 
 
12 2 1.20% 
 
2005 5 3.01% 
  
166 100.00% 
  
166 100.00% 
    
        Panel D: “After” Sample Distribution of firms by 
Two Digit SIC  
   
        
 
Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
 
Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
 
10 1 1.20% 
 
36 11 13.25% 
 
13 6 7.23% 
 
37 3 3.61% 
 
14 1 1.20% 
 
38 4 4.82% 
 
20 3 3.61% 
 
40 2 2.41% 
 
22 1 1.20% 
 
45 1 1.20% 
 
23 1 1.20% 
 
48 4 4.82% 
 
24 1 1.20% 
 
50 2 2.41% 
 
25 1 1.20% 
 
52 2 2.41% 
 
26 4 4.82% 
 
53 1 1.20% 
 
27 1 1.20% 
 
54 2 2.41% 
 
28 11 13.25% 
 
56 1 1.20% 
 
29 2 2.41% 
 
57 1 1.20% 
 
31 1 1.20% 
 
59 1 1.20% 
 
32 1 1.20% 
 
73 3 3.61% 
 
33 3 3.61% 
 
87 1 1.20% 
 
35 6 7.23% 
  
83 100.00% 
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 Figure 2 provides additional information about the distribution of the SPSEG in the 
sample.  Panel A illustrates that a large portion of “Before” grants in this sample occur the day 
prior to an EAD, consistent with the results in AK.  Additionally, more SPSEG are granted in the 
first fiscal quarter than in any other quarter.  
5.1.2 “After” sample 
Table 2, Panels C and D show that 166 grants meet the criteria to be in the “After” 
sample in the pre-2006 period.  Similar to the “Before” sample, the majority of these grants 
occur in the early years in the sample and a relatively larger percentage belong to the chemical 
and electrical industries.  A relatively large number of grants occur in February, similar to that 
documented in other studies.  Approximately 71% of the firms in this sample have calendar year 
ends. 
Figure 2, Panel B shows that “After” grants are distributed more evenly over the period 
after the EAD than are the “Before” grants.  Additionally, the “After” grants are most likely to 
occur in the first quarter. 
5.2 Grant Distribution – post-2005 
Since the reporting requirements for executive compensation changed for fiscal years 
ending in 2006, I obtain the stock option grant or restricted stock grant date directly from 
Compustat’s Execucomp database.  I present and analyze this data separately from the pre-2006 
data because the reporting environment and degree of transparency with respect to equity grants 
differs greatly in the pre-2006 versus the post-2005 period. 
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Figure 2 
 SPSEG Distribution - pre-2006 Sample 
 
Panel A: “Before” Sample    Panel B: “After” Sample 
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5.2.1 “Before” sample 
 Table 3, Panels A and B provide descriptive information pertaining to restricted stock and 
stock option grants occurring during the years 2006 – 2010 for the “Before” sample.  The grants 
are fairly evenly distributed over the five years in the sample.  The monthly distribution of grants 
is similar to that in the pre-2006 period in that many grants occur near the beginning of the 
calendar year.  However, relatively large numbers of grants occur in January, April, July, and 
October, the months after calendar year-end quarter-ends.  The electronics industry is over-
represented in the sample as in the pre-2006 period.   
Figure 3, Panel A shows that the “Before” grants occur in clusters: the majority occur the 
day prior to an EAD as in the earlier period, with another group being granted 20 days prior to 
the EAD.  As in the prior period, equity grants are more likely to occur in the first quarter. 
5.2.2 “After” sample 
 Table 3, Panel C shows a relatively large portion of the grants occur at the beginning of 
the calendar year with clusters also in May, August and November.  Table 3, Panel D indicates 
that the industry representation is very similar to that in the “Before” sample; however, Business 
Services (SIC 73) is also highly represented.  The frequency of “After” grants is heavily 
weighted toward the middle of the sample period  This difference might be due in part to a 
smaller percentage of firms in this sub-sample having calendar year-end firms.  In this sample, 
only 49.2% of the firms are calendar year-end firms.   
Figure 3, Panel B illustrates that a large percentage of SPSEG occur in the first week 
after the EAD with increased frequency occurring at approximately weekly intervals.  Grants are 
most likely to occur during the first quarter. 
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Table 3 
SPSEG Distribution - post-2005 Sample 
Panel A: “Before” Sample Distribution of SPSEG by Calendar 
Year and Month 
  
       Year Freq. Percent 
 
Month Freq. Percent 
2006 13 17.11% 
 
1 19 25.00% 
2007 18 23.68% 
 
2 14 18.42% 
2008 17 22.37% 
 
3 0 0.00% 
2009 16 21.05% 
 
4 13 17.11% 
2010 12 15.79% 
 
5 1 1.32% 
 
76 100.00% 
 
6 2 2.63% 
    
7 11 14.47% 
    
8 2 2.63% 
    
9 0 0.00% 
    
10 13 17.11% 
    
11 1 1.32% 
    
12 0 0.00% 
     
76 100.00% 
Panel B: “Before” Sample Distribution of firms by Two Digit SIC  
  
       Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
    
       13 4 11.76% 
    14 1 2.94% 
    20 4 11.76% 
    28 3 8.82% 
    33 1 2.94% 
    34 1 2.94% 
    35 3 8.82% 
    36 6 17.65% 
    37 2 5.88% 
    38 1 2.94% 
    47 1 2.94% 
    48 1 2.94% 
    50 1 2.94% 
    72 1 2.94% 
    73 2 5.88% 
    78 1 2.94% 
    79 1 2.94% 
    
 
34 100.00% 
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Table 3 
SPSEG Distribution - post-2005 Sample 
Panel C: “After” Sample Distribution of SPSEG by Calendar 
Year and Month 
         
Year Freq. Percent 
 
Month Freq. Percent 
2006 18 14.40% 
 
1 15 12.00% 
2007 39 31.20% 
 
2 33 26.40% 
2008 30 24.00% 
 
3 8 6.40% 
2009 26 20.80% 
 
4 7 5.60% 
2010 12 9.60% 
 
5 10 8.00% 
 
125 100.00% 
 
6 1 0.80% 
    
7 3 2.40% 
    
8 21 16.80% 
    
9 5 4.00% 
    
10 2 1.60% 
    
11 15 12.00% 
    
12 5 4.00% 
     
125 100.00% 
       Panel D: “After” Sample Distribution of firms by Two Digit 
SIC 
  
       Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
 
Two digit SIC Freq. Percent 
       13 1 1.54% 
 
39 1 1.54% 
14 1 1.54% 
 
40 1 1.54% 
15 1 1.54% 
 
48 2 3.08% 
20 3 4.62% 
 
50 1 1.54% 
23 1 1.54% 
 
53 3 4.62% 
26 2 3.08% 
 
55 2 3.08% 
27 2 3.08% 
 
56 4 6.15% 
28 2 3.08% 
 
58 2 3.08% 
32 1 1.54% 
 
59 1 1.54% 
33 2 3.08% 
 
72 1 1.54% 
34 1 1.54% 
 
73 8 12.31% 
35 4 6.15% 
 
75 1 1.54% 
36 8 12.31% 
 
80 2 3.08% 
37 1 1.54% 
 
87 1 1.54% 
38 5 7.69% 
  
65 100.00% 
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Figure 3 
SPSEG Distribution post-2005 Sample 
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5.3  Descriptive Statistics – pre-2006 
5.3.1 “Before” sample 
I generate the necessary variables using information from I/B/E/S, Compustat, and CRSP.  
Table 4, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the “Before” quarters in which an SPSEG 
occurs (“Treatment” quarters).  Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for these same firms 
for the quarters with no equity granting activity (“Control” quarters).  Approximately 9.3% of the 
“Before” sample is made up of SPSEG firm-quarter observations (189/(189+1,834)). FCRev 
reflects the change in analyst consensus for each firm-quarter scaled by price at the beginning of 
the quarter.36  Untabulated t-statistics find that there is no difference in the forecast revision 
between the Treatment and Control quarters in the “Before” sample.  The average option Value 
is approximately 193.6% of the CEO’s annual salary.  Any given award is the firm’s Biggest 
award in the sub-sample period approximately 50.8% of the time, consistent with the average 
firm having approximately two grants in the sample.  TotAssets measures firm size, calculated as 
the log of the total assets.  The average firm size is approximately $4.7 billion (note that since 
panels A and B represent the same firms, I refer only to the means shown in Panel B for brevity).  
ChEPS measures the change of EPS (taken from I/B/E/S) from quarter q-4 to quarter q, scaled by 
price at the beginning of the quarter and is approximately 0.2%.  Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of firm i’s quarterly EPS (from I/B/E/S) scaled by the absolute value of the 
mean calculated over the previous five quarters.  The continuous independent variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  Untabulated t-statistics confirm that there are no  
                                                             
36 Following prior literature, I scale forecast revision by price instead of by the initial forecast to eliminate issues 
with small denominators. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics –pre-2006 Sample 
Panel A: “Before” Sample/Treatment 
   
Panel B: “Before” Sample/ Control 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FCRev 189 -0.067 0.352 -2.432 1.029 
 
FCRev 1834 -0.07        0.83 -18.35 15.42 
Value 189 1.936 1.612 0.042 5.165 
       Biggest 189 0.508 0.501 0 1 
       TotAssets 189 7.740 1.361 5.045 12.199 
 
TotAssets 1834 8.074 1.41  5.04  12.45  
ChEPS 189 0.003 0.011 -0.040 0.040 
 
ChEPS 1834 0.002 0.00  -0.040 0.04  
Volatility 189 0.582 1.019 0.040 5.626 
 
Volatility 1834 0.43  0.68  0.040 5.62  
             Panel C: “After” Sample/Treatment 
   
Panel D: “After” Sample/ Control 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FCRev 166 -0.035 0.350 -2.546 1.890 
 
FCRev 156  -0.03  0.42  -5.90  5.41  
Value 166 1.306 0.927 0.008 3.061 
       Biggest 166 0.500 0.502 0 1 
       TotAssets 166 7.609 1.360 4.838 10.437 
 
TotAssets 156  8.057 1.34  4.83  10.814 
ChEPS 166 0.002 0.009 -0.030 0.037 
 
ChEPS 156  0.002 0.00  -0.03  0.03  
Volatility 166 0.431 0.703 0.038 4.725 
 
Volatility 156  0.417 0.65  0.03  4.72  
Bonus_L 166 0.893 0.633 0.000 3.115 
 
Bonus_L 156  0.946 0.89  0.00  6.62  
OptEx_L 166 2.024 6.691 0.000 62.442 
 
OptEx_L 156  2.850 7.63  0.00  62.442 
StockHeld 166 47.303 182.758 0.126 1,591.287 
 
StockHeld 156  74.33  246.84  0.12  1,591.287 
EM 166 3.120 1.200 1 5 
 
EM 156  3.090 1.24  1  55 
Treatment reflects quarters in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to (30 days after) the EAD for the Before (After) sample. Control reflects the same-firm firm-quarters in which no equity 
activity occurs. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in 
which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement 
for quarter q-1.   Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by salary in year t.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if Value of the award is the largest for the firm during the sample 
period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings from continuing operations 
divided by the absolute value of the mean quarterly earnings calculated over the  
previous five quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is 
the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM 
measures the relative level of discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, 
Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.   
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statistically significant differences between the variables in Panels A and B, consistent with the 
same firms being represented in the two panels. 
5.3.2 “After” sample 
 Table 4, Panels C and D provide descriptive information for the “After” sample.  The 
control variables that are consistent for the “Before” and “After” samples are largely similar.  
The average CEO bonus in year t+1 is 94.6% of the prior year’s salary.  The value of options 
exercised in year t+1 is almost three times the CEO’s salary in year t, while the CEO’s stock 
holding of the firm is more than 74 times the CEO’s annual salary. 
5.4  Descriptive Statistics – post-2005 
5.4.1 “Before” sample 
Table 5, Panels A and B reveal that approximately 15.0% (76/(76+430)) of the firm-
quarter observations in the “Before” sample have an SPSEG.  Untabulated t-statistics reveal that 
the difference in FCRev is not significantly different between the “treatment” and “control” 
observations.  Many of the other descriptive statistics are similar to those in the pre-2006 sample.  
The mean value of the equity grants are 2.7 times the CEO salary. 
5.4.2 “After” sample 
 This percentage of treatment observations is 22.8% in the “After” sample.  The value of 
equity grants is 3.7 times salary and the average amount of stock held by CEOs is 6,352 times 
salary in this sample period.37,38  
                                                             
37 This reflects eight observations in which the CEO salary is $1. Removing those observations results in mean 
StockHeld of approximately 46 and 35 times salary in Panels C and D, respectively. 
 
38 I use the log of StockHeld in the subsequent regression analysis because the distribution is right-skewed. 
 
 
 
 
39 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics – post-2005 Sample 
Panel A:”Before” Sample /Treatment 
    
Panel B: “Before” Sample/Control 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FCRev 76 -0.140 0.718 -5.918 0.473 
 
FCRev 430 0.005 0.383 -1.865 5.504 
Value 76 2.739 2.335 0.145 7.407 
       Biggest 76 0.447 0.501 0 1 
       TotAssets 76 7.904 1.398 5.042 10.452 
 
TotAssets 430 8.463 1.149 5.042 11.052 
ChEPS 76 -0.001 0.010 -0.042 0.026 
 
ChEPS 430 0.001 0.010 -0.042 0.027 
Volatility 76 0.331 0.539 0.057 3.381 
 
Volatility 430 0.385 0.578 0.052 3.381 
             Panel C: “After” Sample/Treatment 
  
Panel D: “After” Sample/Control 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FCRev 125 -0.123 1.058 -11.486 0.765 
 
FCRev 424 -0.034 0.458 -1.965 5.923 
Value 125 3.710 2.654 0.021 10.337 
       Biggest 125 0.512 0.502 0 1 
       TotAssets 125 8.106 1.333 4.514 10.675 
 
TotAssets 424 8.154 1.221 4.514 10.758 
ChEPS 125 0.001 0.009 -0.025 0.036 
 
ChEPS 424 0.000 0.011 -0.043 0.036 
Bonus_L 125 0.225 0.643 0.000 2.791 
 
Bonus_L 424 0.136 0.469 0.000 4.444 
OptEx_L 125 2.819 5.428 0.000 30.698 
 
OptEx_L 424 2.247 4.682 0.000 30.698 
Volatility 125 0.523 0.927 0.030 7.776 
 
Volatility 424 0.554 1.053 0.030 7.776 
StockHeld 125 3,107.623 34,223.830 1.027 382,678.200 
 
StockHeld 424 6,352.462 48,815.570 1.027 382,678.200 
EM 125 3.240 1.247 1 5 
 
EM 424 2.988 1.309 1 5 
Treatment reflects quarters in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to (30 days after) the EAD for the Before (After) sample. Control reflects the same-firm firm-quarters in which no equity 
activity occurs. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in 
which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement 
for quarter q-1.   Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by salary in year t.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if Value of the award is the largest for the firm during the sample 
period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings from continuing operations 
divided by the absolute value of the mean quarterly earnings calculated over the previous five quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is 
the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. StockHeld is the value of 
the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the relative level of discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of 
income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.   
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5.5 Correlation Tables 
5.5.1  Univariate Results – pre-2006 
Table 6 Panels A and B provide the correlation tables for the “Before” and “After” 
samples.  The italics indicate that the correlation is significant at the ten percent level.  FCRev is 
not strongly correlated with the SPSEG measures in either sample.  As expected, the SPSEG 
measures are highly correlated.  ChEPS and Volatility are positively associated with FCRev in 
the “Before” sample, as expected, while Volatility is negatively correlated with forecast revisions 
in the “After” sample.   TotAssets is not significantly correlated with FCRev in either sample.  
Counter to expectation, next year’s bonus and exercised options are positively correlated with 
forecast revisions.  This likely reflects the fact that the compensation variables are measured on a 
yearly basis and therefore the relationship between quarter q’s forecast revision and year t+1’s 
compensation is not direct. However, incorporating these variables into the analysis is important 
given the value of these variables relative to CEO salary.  In general, the control variables appear 
to be free of multicollinearity issues. 
5.5.2  Univariate Results – post-2005 
 Table 7, Panels A and B provide the correlations for the post-2005 period.  Unlike in the 
pre-2006 period, both Either and Value are negatively and significantly correlated with forecast 
revisions in the “Before” sample. Value is negatively correlated in the “After” sample, contrary 
to expectation.  ChEPS is positively correlated with FCRev, as expected.   
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Table 6 
Correlation Tables –pre-2006 Sample 
Panel A: “Before” Sample 
     
 
     
 
FCRev SPSEG Value Biggest TotAssets ChEPS Volatility 
     FCRev 1.000 
     
 
     SPSEG 0.001 1.000 
    
 
     Value 0.004 0.754 1.000 
   
 
     Biggest -0.002 0.695 0.605 1.000 
  
 
     TotAssets 0.035 -0.069 -0.061 -0.079 1.000 
 
 
     ChEPS 0.318 0.022 0.028 0.050 0.066 1.000  
     Volatility 0.121 0.061 0.021 0.106 -0.014 0.164 1.000   
    
Panel B: “After” Sample 
     
 
     
 
FCRev SPSEG Value Biggest TotAssets ChEPS Volatility Bonus_L OptEx_L StockHeld EM 
 FCRev 1.000 
     
 
  
 
  SPSEG 0.002 1.000 
    
 
  
 
  Value 0.006 0.802 1.000 
   
 
  
 
  Biggest -0.003 0.689 0.613 1.000 
  
 
  
 
  TotAssets 0.017 -0.098 -0.070 -0.093 1.000 
 
 
  
 
  ChEPS 0.335 0.009 -0.007 0.004 -0.013 1.000  
  
 
  Volatility -0.065 0.006 -0.012 0.036 -0.085 0.163 1.000 
  
 
  Bonus_L 0.069 -0.018 0.007 -0.016 0.263 0.034 -0.051 1.000 
 
 
  OptEx_L 0.065 -0.032 0.031 -0.002 0.037 0.045 -0061 0.168 1.000  
  StockHeld 0.028 -0.033 -0.005 -0.007 -0.074 -0.016 -0.071 -0.057 0.009 1.000 
  EM -0.001 0.007 -0.010 -0.021 0.029 0.049 -0.005 0.008 -0.036 -0.024 1.000  
 
FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a 
forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.  
SPSEG reflects firm quarters in which an SPSEG occurs in the 30 days prior (subsequent) to the EAD for the “Before” (“After”) sample.  Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by 
salary in year t.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if Value of the award is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS 
= (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings from continuing operations divided by the absolute value of the mean quarterly earnings calculated over the previous 
five quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value 
of the CEO options exercised for firm i year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the 
relative level of discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, Bonus_L, 
OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  Italics indicate the correlation is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7 
Correlation Tables – post-2005 Sample 
Panel A: “Before” Sample 
     
 
     
 
FCRev Either Value Biggest TotAssets ChEPS Volatility 
     FCRev 1.000 
     
 
     Either -0.115 1.000 
    
 
     Value -0.080 0.736 1.000 
   
 
     Biggest -0.013 0.638 0.654 1.000 
  
 
     TotAssets -0.002 -0.166 0.058 -0.039 1.000 
 
 
     ChEPS 0.203 -0.077 -0.051 -0.033 0.017 1.000  
     Volatility 0.100 -0.034 -0.018 0.003 -0.190 0.215 1.000   
   
       
 
     Panel B: “After” Sample 
      
 
     
 
FCRev Either Value Biggest TotAssets ChEPS Volatility Bonus_L OptEx_L StockHeld EM 
FCRev 1.000 
     
 
    Either -0.058 1.000 
    
 
    Value -0.112 0.777 1.000 
   
 
    Biggest 0.025 0.669 0.548 1.000 
  
 
    TotAssets -0.024 -0.016 0.134 -0.063 1.000 
 
 
    ChEPS 0.208 0.064 0.033 0.070 -0.012 1.000  
    Volatility 0.030 -0.013 -0.043 0.023 -0.132 0.177 1.000     
Bonus_L -0.002 0.073 0.097 0.023 0.124 -0.059 -0.049 1.000    
OptEx_L 0.040 0.049 0.038 -0.016 -0.084 -0.025 -0.090 0.081 1.000 
  StockHeld 0.010 -0.030 0.027 -0.044 -0.118 0.003 -0.031 -0.037 -0.060 1.000 
 EM -0.049 0.081 0.091 0.088 -0.010 0.056 0.070 -0.020 -0.051 -0.028 1.000 
 
FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a 
forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.  
Either reflects firm quarters in which an SPSEG occurs in the 30 days prior (subsequent) to the EAD for the “Before” (“After”) sample.  Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by 
CEO salary in year t.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if Value of the award is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  
ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings from continuing operations divided by the absolute value of the mean quarterly earnings calculated over the 
previous five quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is 
the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM 
measures the relative level of discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, 
Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  Italics indicate the correlation is significant at the 10% level.
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5.6   Multivariate analyses 
5.6.1 “Before” Sample – pre-2006 
Table 8 panel A provides the regression results for the “Before” sample.  Columns (1) – 
(3) provide the results for the three SPSEG measures over the entire period 1992 – 2005.  ChEPS 
is significantly positive, consistent with expectations.  Neither size nor volatility is significant. 
Column (3) provides evidence consistent with managers providing more negative information to 
analysts prior to an SPSEG when it occurs prior to an EAD when the grant is largest grant in the 
period.  Columns (4) – (6) provide the regression results for the sample period prior to SOX, 
defined as August 29, 2002, consistent with prior studies. I am unable to reject the null that 
managers do not appear to provide more bad news in “Before” quarters.    This is consistent with 
firms relying more on backdating during this period.   Columns (7) – (9) examine the period after 
SOX.  Volatility becomes significantly positive in these regressions although ChEPS is not.  The 
coefficients on SPSEG and Biggest are significantly negative, suggesting that managers are more 
likely to engage in downward expectations management when backdating became a more costly 
alternative. 
In untabulated results, I find that the average scaled FCRev in the period SOX – 2005 is  
-0.027 for firm-quarters without equity granting activity.  The coefficient of -0.120 suggests that 
the walk-down is approximately four times steeper for the “Before” sample treatment quarters, 
controlling for other factors.  
5.6.2  “Before” sample post-2005 
 Table 8, Panel B provides results about whether managers are similarly inspired to 
engage in expectations management in the period 2006 – 2010, when the level of transparency in 
executive compensation increased.  These tests include predictable stock grants as well as 
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Table 8 
Regression Results – “Before” Sample 
Panel A: pre-2006 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev 
                      
SPSEG - -0.063 
  
-0.044 
  
-0.120** 
  
  
(-1.300) 
  
(-0.700) 
  
(-2.347) 
  Value - 
 
-0.007 
 
  -0.001 
 
  -0.024 
 
   
(-0.972) 
 
  (-0.061) 
 
  (-1.489) 
 Biggest - 
  
-0.121*   
 
-0.115   
 
-0.117* 
    
(-1.777)   
 
(-1.343)   
 
(-1.972) 
TotAssets - 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.038 0.040 0.032 -0.236 -0.229 -0.244 
  
(0.640) (0.740) (0.587) (0.980) (1.030) (0.908) (-1.307) (-1.260) (-1.320) 
ChEPS + 21.749*** 21.730*** 20.990*** 25.010*** 24.997*** 24.372*** 10.958 10.816 11.029 
  
(3.492) (3.487) (3.479) (2.971) (2.966) (2.981) (1.257) (1.239) (1.250) 
Volatility + 0.134 0.133 0.132 0.120 0.119 0.115 0.240* 0.241* 0.238* 
  
(1.634) (1.629) (1.572) (1.231) (1.233) (1.164) (1.838) (1.846) (1.814) 
Constant 
 
-0.275 -0.300 -0.273 -0.469 -0.491 -0.421 1.826 1.764 1.898 
  
(-1.537) (-1.608) (-1.440) (-1.422) (-1.463) (-1.387) (1.240) (1.191) (1.257) 
     
  
  
  
  Observations 
 
2,023 2,023 1,930 1,447 1,447 1,367 576 576 563 
R-squared 
 
0.094 0.093 0.085 0.133 0.133 0.123 0.039 0.038 0.038 
# of firms   97 97 97 87 87 87 68 68 68 
Sample period  1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-SOX 1992-SOX 1992-SOX SOX-2005 SOX-2005 SOX-2005 
 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 1. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the 
consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is 
measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    SPSEG is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes 
value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end 
of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five quarters for firm-
quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  SOX is August 29, 2002.   Value, TotAssets, ChEPS ,and Volatility are winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run 
using firm fixed-effects.  Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 8 
Regression Results – “Before” Sample 
Panel B: post-2005 
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev 
          
Either - -0.121 
  
  
(-1.436) 
  Value - 
 
-0.018 
 
   
(-1.187) 
 Biggest - 
  
-0.022 
    
(-0.532) 
TotAssets - 0.156* 0.166* 0.184* 
  
(1.968) (1.919) (1.983) 
ChEPS + 8.263 8.517 2.409 
  
(1.150) (1.200) (0.360) 
Volatility + 0.087* 0.089* 0.060 
  
(2.003) (2.014) (1.555) 
Constant 
 
-1.343* -1.438* -1.572* 
  
(-2.064) (-2.013) (-2.040) 
     Observations 
 
506 506 464 
R-squared 
 
0.068 0.064 0.023 
# of firms   34 34 34 
Sample period  2006-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 1. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month 
of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a 
forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-
quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    Either is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in 
which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by CEO 
salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of 
total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly 
EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five quarters for firm-quarters in which there are 
at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, and Volatility are winsorized at the 1% level.  All 
regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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predictable stock option grants. I am unable to reject the null that managers do not engage in a 
change in expectation management in quarters in which an SPSEG occurs shortly before an EAD.      
5.6.3  “After” sample pre-2006 
 Table 9, Panel A provides the regression results for the “After” sample.  Similar to Table 
8, Panel A, the table represents the sample taken as a whole and divided into two separate time 
periods (1992-SOX and SOX-2005).  The control variables are largely insignificant with the 
exception of ChEPS and Bonus_L.  The coefficient on ChEPS is as expected while the 
coefficient on the bonus in year t+1 is positive as in the pre-2006 period.  The coefficients on the 
SPSEG measures are not consistent with either an increased or decreased walk-down when an 
SPSEG occurs after an EAD in any time period. 
5.6.4 “After” sample post-2005  
 Table 9, Panel B provides the results for testing H2 and H3 in the post-2005 period.  The 
coefficients on the SPSEG measures are not significantly different from zero. I am unable to 
reject the null that managers do not engage in a change in expectation management when an 
equity grant occurs just after an EAD.   
5.7 Summary of Main Analyses 
 I conclude from the main analyses that managers appear to disclose more negative news 
in quarters in which an SPSEG occurs before an EAD than they do in other non-equity granting 
quarters in the period after SOX, but not after the change in compensation reporting 
requirements. Both results are consistent with the Jell-O Effect; managers appear to turn to 
expectation management when the use of backdating becomes more costly and refrain from the 
practice when firms are required to disclose the timing of grants relative to the disclosure of 
other non-public information.   
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Table 9 
Regression Results – “After” Sample 
Panel A: pre-2006 
             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev 
           
SPSEG + 0.014 
  
0.019 
  
-0.035 
  
  
(0.545) 
  
(0.621) 
  
(-0.744) 
  Value + 
 
0.005 
 
  0.005 
 
  0.002 
 
   
(0.432) 
 
  (0.388) 
 
  (0.126) 
 Biggest + 
  
0.017   
 
0.019   
 
-0.053 
    
(0.464)   
 
(0.436)   
 
(-1.063) 
TotAssets - 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.000 0.007 -0.003 
  
(0.659) (0.648) (0.586) (0.238) (0.195) (0.206) (-0.002) (0.134) (-0.060) 
ChEPS + 15.526*** 15.530*** 15.610*** 15.013*** 15.023*** 15.102*** 11.359 11.418 11.388 
  
(5.080) (5.093) (5.146) (4.141) (4.162) (4.128) (1.419) (1.437) (1.421) 
Volatility + -0.035 -0.035 -0.030 -0.041 -0.041 -0.035 0.094 0.093 0.094 
  (-1.364) (-1.366) (-1.188) (-1.164) (-1.167) (-0.983) (1.275) (1.281) (1.276) 
Bonus_L - 0.042** 0.042** 0.043** 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.033* 0.033* 0.032* 
  
(2.584) (2.590) (2.640) (1.365) (1.369) (1.433) (1.880) (1.913) (1.831) 
OptEx_L - 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 
  
(0.073) (0.068) (-0.031) (-0.557) (-0.559) (-0.675) (-0.897) (-0.909) (-0.920) 
StockHeld - 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  
(1.138) (1.109) (1.308) (0.350) (0.330) (0.484) (0.070) (0.090) (0.068) 
EM 
 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 0.004 0.004 0.005 
  
(-1.444) (-1.430) (-1.554) (-1.213) (-1.206) (-1.300) (0.415) (0.436) (0.465) 
Constant 
 
-0.206 -0.200 -0.196 -0.136 -0.123 -0.135 -0.068 -0.129 0.046 
  
(-1.111) (-1.107) (-1.063) (-0.568) (-0.528) (-0.546) (-0.166) (-0.299) (-0.112) 
     
  
  
  
  Observations 
 
1,729 1,729 1,646 1,317 1,317 1,240 412 412 406 
R-squared 
 
0.114 0.114 0.112 0.102 0.102 0.099 0.089 0.089 0.090 
# of firms  83 83 83 80 80 80 54 54 54 
Sample period  1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-SOX 1992-SOX 1992-SOX SOX-2005 SOX-2005 SOX-2005 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 2. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the 
consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is 
measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    SPSEG is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days subsequent to the EAD. Value is the Black-
Scholes value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at 
the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five quarters 
for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value of the CEO 
options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the relative 
level of discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  SOX is August 29, 2002. Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, 
Volatility, Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results – “After” Sample 
Panel B: post-2005 
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCREv 
          
Either + -0.122 
  
  
(-1.074) 
  Value + 
 
-0.039 
 
   
(-0.922) 
 Biggest + 
  
-0.004 
    
(-0.146) 
TotAssets - -0.088 -0.095 -0.225 
  
(-0.611) (-0.688) (-1.358) 
ChEPS + 11.412** 11.241** 12.740** 
  
(2.698) (2.623) (2.738) 
Volatility + -0.038 -0.042 -0.040 
  
(-1.100) (-1.145) (-1.363) 
Bonus_L - -0.038 -0.041 -0.035 
  
(-0.589) (-0.639) (-0.536) 
OptEx_L - 0.041* 0.037* 0.021 
  
(1.860) (1.928) (1.427) 
StockHeld - 0.006 0.005 -0.013 
  
(0.247) (0.199) (-0.574) 
EM 
 
-0.029 -0.025 -0.001 
  
(-0.726) (-0.695) (-0.064) 
Constant 
 
0.774 0.830 1.854 
  
(0.650) (0.720) (1.326) 
     Observations 
 
549 549 488 
R-squared 
 
0.046 0.053 0.116 
# of firms   65 65 65 
Sample period  2006-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 2. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 
earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-
quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the 
earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    Either is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days subsequent 
to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the 
largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-
4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five 
quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 
scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. 
StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the relative level of 
discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, 
TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  
Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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The use of expectation management appears to be different depending on the timing of 
the SPSEG relative to a nearby EAD.  As opposed to the findings discussed above, I find no 
evidence that managers engage in a heightened or attenuated walk-down when the equity grant 
occurs shortly after an EAD, in any period.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
I perform sensitivity tests to check the robustness of my conclusions.  
6.1  Winsorizing 
 The main tests described above were performed after the continuous independent 
variables were winsorized in order to remove noise from outliers.  The main results generally 
hold when I perform the analyses without winsorizing.  Table 10 provides the results for the 
exception: the “Before” sample analysis performed in the pre-2006 period.  Comparing the 
results to Table 8, Panel A, the coefficient of interest in Column (3) is no longer significant when 
looking at the time period as a whole.  Additionally, when examining the period SOX-2005, the  
coefficient on Value is significant while the coefficient on Biggest is insignificant.  Overall, these 
results provide more evidence consistent with that described in the summary of the main 
analyses. 
6.2  Fiscal quarter comparisons 
 Equity granting behavior is concentrated in the first fiscal quarter as observed in Figures 
2 and 3.  Therefore, using all non-equity granting quarters as control quarters may not be directly 
comparable insofar as quarterly effects exist.   I limit the both the treatment and control sample 
to fiscal first quarters, rendering the control observations more comparable.  The coefficients of 
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Table 10 
Sensitivity Tests – No Winsorization 
"Before" Sample, Pre-2006, Compare to Table 8, Panel A 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Exp Sign FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev FCRev 
                      
SPSEG - -0.051 
  
-0.040 
  
-0.104** 
  
  
(-1.294) 
  
(-0.835) 
  
(-2.067) 
  Value - 
 
-0.001 
 
  -0.000 
 
  -0.011* 
 
   
(-0.624) 
 
  (-0.215) 
 
  (-1.720) 
 Biggest - 
  
-0.075   
 
-0.065   
 
-0.091 
    
(-1.437)   
 
(-1.034)   
 
(-1.668) 
TotAssets - 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.010 -0.248 -0.240 -0.254 
  
(0.809) (0.906) (0.888) (0.490) (0.554) (0.468) (-1.384) (-1.332) (-1.391) 
ChEPS + 10.652*** 10.632*** 10.244*** 11.111*** 11.093*** 10.686*** 6.498*** 6.465*** 6.488*** 
  
(4.926) (4.944) (4.308) (4.439) (4.460) (3.723) (3.229) (3.173) (3.199) 
Volatility + 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.106 0.107 0.105 
  
(1.091) (1.090) (1.078) (1.035) (1.035) (1.021) (1.019) (1.025) (1.013) 
Constant 
 
-0.219 -0.245 -0.240 -0.183 -0.203 -0.185 1.995 1.928 2.048 
  
(-1.346) (-1.432) (-1.393) (-1.088) (-1.125) (-1.036) (1.354) (1.299) (1.362) 
     
  
  
  
  Observations 
 
2,023 2,023 1,930 1,447 1,447 1,367 576 576 563 
R-squared 
 
0.099 0.099 0.086 0.145 0.145 0.123 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Number of firms 
 
97 97 97 87 87 87 68 68 68 
Sample period   1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-SOX 1992-SOX 1992-SOX SOX-2005 SOX-2005 SOX-2005 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 1. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the 
consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is 
measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1. SPSEG is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes 
value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end 
of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five quarters for firm-
quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  SOX is August 29, 2002.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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interest are generally insignificant, consistent with the results of the main tests shown in Table 8, 
Panel B and Table 9, Panels A and B.  The only exception is for the “Before” sample in the pre-
2006 period.  I provide these results in Table 11 which is comparable with Table 8, Panel A, 
Columns 1 – 3.   
 The number of observations is greatly reduced as I require each firm to have at least one 
equity-granting fiscal first quarter and two fiscal first quarter observations in the sample (for 
comparison purposes).  I only provide the regression results for the entire pre-2006 time period 
as the research design constraints limit the sample to less than 20 observations in the post-SOX 
period.  The coefficient on SPSEG of -0.154 suggests the walk-down is more than twice as steep 
in equity-granting fiscal first quarters than it is in non-equity granting fiscal first quarters in the 
pre-2006 period.39  Additionally, the coefficient on Biggest is significantly negative, suggesting 
the results in Table 8, Panel A are robust to this alternative specification. 
6.3  Proximity of “After” grants to the EAD 
 As mentioned in McAnally et al. (2008), the amount of time between the EAD and the 
subsequent grant is likely to affect whether the manager engages in behavior to miss an earnings  
expectation.  The further an SPSEG occurs from the EAD, the more likely the manager is to 
disclose information (subsequent to the EAD) relating to next quarter’s earnings to effect a 
change in stock price.  Therefore, I restrict the “After” sample to grants that occur in a more 
restricted time period after the EAD, as shown in Table 12.  Following the evidence in Figure 3, 
Panel B, I restrict my sample to incorporate the clusters in granting activity to see if evidence of 
a walk-up is more evident when the grant occurs closer to the EAD.  I restrict the grant to occur 
in the six, eight, and 15 days after the EAD.  Untabulated results reflect those found in the main  
                                                             
39 In untabulated results, I find that the mean forecast revision is -0.065 in non-equity granting fiscal first quarters in 
this sample period. 
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Table 11 
Sensitivity Tests – Fiscal Quarter Specific  
“Before” Sample, 1992-2005, First fiscal quarters only 
Compare to Table 8, Panel A, Columns (1) – (3) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev 
          
SPSEG - -0.154**     
  
(-2.419)     
Value -   -0.036   
  
  (-1.595)   
Biggest -     -0.095* 
  
    (-2.038) 
TotAssets - -0.048 -0.042 -0.010 
  
(-1.235) (-0.794) (-0.206) 
ChEPS + 19.899*** 19.642*** 15.065*** 
  
(8.359) (4.915) (7.106) 
Volatility + 0.117*** 0.113** 0.104*** 
  
(3.162) (2.888) (11.541) 
Constant 
 
0.277 0.197 -0.057 
  
(0.900) (0.460) (-0.149) 
     Observations 
 
94 94 76 
R-squared 
 
0.406 0.377 0.313 
Number of firms 
 
16 16 16 
Sample period   1992-2005 1992-2005 1992-2005 
 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 1a. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the 
month of the q-1 earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which 
there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the 
firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    SPSEG is a dummy variable = 1 in the 
quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days prior to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant 
scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the largest for the firm during the sample period.  
TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard 
deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five quarters for firm-
quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Value, TotAssets, ChEPS, and Volatility are 
winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust 
t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 12 
Sensitivity Tests - Proximity of “After” Grants to EAD 
“After” Sample, 2006-2010, SPSEG occurring <9 days after EAD 
Compare to Table 9, Panel B 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev 
          
Either + -0.045 
  
  
(-1.048) 
  Value + 
 
0.026*** 
 
   
(3.108) 
 Biggest + 
  
-0.015 
    
(-0.357) 
TotAssets - -0.265** -0.271** -0.407** 
  
(-2.237) (-2.266) (-2.561) 
ChEPS + 15.253** 15.096** 17.759** 
  
(2.532) (2.531) (2.613) 
Volatility + -0.044*** -0.043** -0.048*** 
  
(-2.869) (-2.793) (-3.374) 
Bonus_L - 0.080 0.071* 0.111 
  
(1.639) (1.770) (1.652) 
OptEx_L - 0.043* 0.042* 0.044** 
  
(1.738) (1.827) (2.082) 
StockHeld - -0.019 -0.022 -0.042 
  
(-0.834) (-0.930) (-1.364) 
EM 
 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.009 
  
(-0.041) (-0.093) (-0.261) 
Constant 
 
2.194** 2.234** 3.418** 
  
(2.141) (2.188) (2.468) 
     Observations 
 
305 305 273 
R-squared 
 
0.138 0.139 0.170 
Number of firms 
 
38 38 38 
Sample period   2006-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 2. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 
earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-
quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the 
earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    Either is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days subsequent 
to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the 
largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-
4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five 
quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 
scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. 
StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the relative level of 
discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, 
TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  
Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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analyses.  The only difference in results is in the post-2005 period when I constrain the definition 
of an SPSEG to occur in the eight days after an EAD.  In this case, the coefficient on Value is 
positive and significant indicating that managers appear to disclose positive news (or less 
negative news) prior to an EAD when an SPSEG occurs within the eight days following an EAD. 
6.4  Large forecast errors 
 Following AK, I remove forecast errors which are more than ten times the firm’s stock 
price.  The main results generally hold.  Table 13 provides the results for the “After” sample in 
the post-2005 period.  In this sub-sample, the coefficient on Value is significantly positive which 
is consistent with a mitigated walk-down when an SPSEG follows an EAD.  
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Table 13 
Sensitivity Tests – Remove Large Forecast Errors 
“After” Sample, 2006 – 2010, Remove large forecast errors, Compare to Table 9, Panel B 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp sign FCRev FCRev FCRev 
          
Either  + -0.004 
  
  
(-0.180) 
  Value + 
 
0.007** 
 
   
(2.106) 
 Biggest + 
  
-0.003 
    
(-0.137) 
TotAssets - -0.143 -0.143 -0.186 
  
(-1.006) (-1.003) (-1.110) 
ChEPS + 12.611*** 12.584*** 13.521*** 
  
(3.028) (3.018) (2.957) 
Volatility + -0.037 -0.035 -0.040 
  (-1.159) (-1.123) (-1.369) 
Bonus_L - -0.070 -0.073 -0.075 
  
(-1.328) (-1.383) (-1.321) 
OptEx_L - 0.029** 0.029** 0.029* 
  
(2.071) (2.107) (1.998) 
StockHeld - 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 
  
(0.012) (-0.003) (-0.324) 
EM 
 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
  
(-0.010) (-0.077) (-0.129) 
Constant 
 
1.152 1.149 1.533 
  
(0.955) (0.951) (1.082) 
     Observations 
 
549 549 488 
R-squared 
 
0.115 0.116 0.127 
Number of firms 
 
65 65 65 
Sample period   2006-2010 2006-2010 2006-2010 
This table reflects the results of the regression model 2. FCRev is defined as (FCrevised – FCinitial) scaled by price during the month of the q-1 
earnings announcement and multiplied by 100. FCrevised is the consensus forecast for the last month in which there is a forecast for the firm-
quarter.  FCinitial is the consensus forecast for the earliest month in which there is a forecast for the firm-quarter.  FCinitial is measured after the 
earnings announcement for quarter q-1.    Either is a dummy variable = 1 in the quarter in which an SPSEG occurs within the 30 days subsequent 
to the EAD. Value is the Black-Scholes value of the option grant scaled by CEO salary.  Biggest is an indicator variable = 1 if the Value is the 
largest for the firm during the sample period.  TotAssets is the log of total assets reported at the end of the quarter.  ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-
4)/Priceq-1.  Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly EPS divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS calculated over the previous five 
quarters for firm-quarters in which there are at least four prior quarters’ earnings information.  Bonus_L is the CEO bonus for firm i in year t+1 
scaled by CEO salary in year t. OptEx_L is the value of the CEO options exercised for firm i in year t+1 scaled by CEO salary for year t. 
StockHeld is the value of the firm’s stocks held by the CEO in year t scaled by CEO salary in year t.  EM measures the relative level of 
discretionary accruals in quarter q and fiscal year t. Higher values indicate higher levels of income increasing discretionary accruals.  Value, 
TotAssets, ChEPS, Volatility, Bonus_L, OptEx_L, and StockHeld are winsorized at the 1% level.  All regressions are run using firm fixed-effects.  
Errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results indicate that the quarterly forecast pattern for firms with predictable equity 
grants differs depending on the timing of the equity grant relative to the earnings announcement 
date, suggesting that managers disclose information consistent with their incentives.  I provide 
some evidence that quarters with an SPSEG prior to the earnings announcement date exhibit a 
significantly “steeper” walk–down than do same-firm firm quarters with no equity granting 
activity.  These results only hold in the period after SOX, suggesting that managers engage in  
expectation management when they are less able to engage in stock option backdating, consistent 
with evidence in Heron and Lie (2007) that backdating is significantly reduced after SOX.  
However, this behavior appears to subside after additional disclosure pertaining to executive 
equity grants is required.  This may indicate that managers benefitted from a certain level of 
opaqueness in the stock option granting environment even when the timing of the grants was 
predictable.  These results are inconsistent with Huang and Lu (2010) who report no evidence of 
spring-loading in the period after SOX.   
The results pertaining to predictable equity grants occurring shortly after an earnings 
announcement date are less clear.  In the main analyses, I find no evidence that managers engage 
in an attenuated walk-down in any period.  Sensitivity tests for the post-SOX period are mixed. 
When constraining the sample to fiscal first quarters in which most SPSEG activity occurs, there 
is no evidence of incremental expectation management over and above that used in the control 
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quarters.  However, when the definition of treatment quarters is limited to those in which the 
grant occurs close to the EAD, some evidence suggests that managers disclose positive news 
prior to an EAD which is followed by an equity grant.  Similar results are found when extremely 
large forecast errors are removed from the sample.  That this behavior follows the 2006 SEC 
amendments to the equity compensation disclosure requirements is interesting.  Given the results 
pertaining to the “Before” sample, it seems CEOs find negative expectation management too 
costly (likely in terms of investor sentiment) after the changes in required disclosure.  However, 
CEOs appear to be less concerned about this cost when the SPSEG occurs after the EAD.  The 
difference might speak to managers’ conflicting incentives related to missing an earnings 
benchmark.  If investors can discern that the CEO times good news disclosures for the purposes 
of missing an earnings benchmark and is risking the value of his/her current firm-equity 
holdings, investors might be less suspicious of CEO myopic behavior.  In this case the CEO is 
motivated to improve the stock price of the firm to make up for the temporary loss in personal 
wealth generated by the missed earnings benchmark. 
As mentioned earlier, the analyses are a joint test of managerial and analyst behavior.  It 
may be the case that certain types of analysts respond to managerial disclosures more fully even 
when managerial incentives are known.  Further studies may investigate whether analyst 
behavior in this setting is differentiable in terms of analyst incentives and characteristics.  
Additionally, changes to the regulatory environment pertaining to analysts (Regulation FD and 
NASD 2711, for example) may also shed light on the findings in this study. 
Overall, the results provide additional clarification about managers’ activities to improve 
the value of their equity compensation.  Most importantly, the study points out that future 
research on this topic needs to consider the relative timing of the grant date and the earnings 
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announcement.  Additionally, it provides further evidence of the relationship between regulation 
and the nuances of managerial decision making. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
DETAILED LIST OF VARIABLES 
 
Dependent Variables 
FCRev = (FCrevised – FCinitial)/Priceq-1 * (100) 
FCRev>0 indicates analyst forecasts became more optimistic. 
FCRev<0 indicates analyst forecasts became more pessimistic.  
where   
FCinitial = Mean forecast for firm i for quarter q for the first month a forecast is 
available following the day after q-1 earnings announcement date.   
FCrevised = Mean forecast for firm i for quarter q for the last month a forecast is 
available prior to the earnings announcement date for quarter q for 
firms with equity grants after the earnings announcement date.  For 
firms with equity grants prior to the earnings announcement date, the 
mean forecast error is calculated in the last month prior to the equity 
grant date for “treatment” observations or prior to the “quasi” grant 
date for “control” observations.40   
Priceq-1 = Firm i monthly share price from CRSP from the month of q-1 EAD. 
Independent variables of Interest 
SPSEG = 1 for firm quarters in which a predictable stock option grant occurs 
within the 30 days prior to or the 30 days after the EADq in the 
period 1992 – 2005. 
Either = 1 for firm quarters in which a predictable stock option grant or 
predictable restricted stock grant occurs within the 30 days prior to or 
the 30 days after the EADq in the period 2006-2010. 
Value = Black-Scholes value of the option or restricted stock grant scaled by 
CEO salary for firm i in year t.  
Biggest = 1 if the SPSEG has the largest Value for firm i during the sub-sample 
period. 
Control variables 
TotAssets = Log total assets (Compustat atq) 
ChEPS = (EPSq – EPSq-4)/Priceq-1.   
Volatility = Standard deviation (EPSq)/Mean(EPSq) over the past five quarters 
Bonus_L = CEO Bonus for firm i for year t+1/CEO Salary for firm i for year t. 
                                                             
40 I calculate the median time difference between the SPSEG and the EAD for each firm.  I use that time span to 
create an artificial break for the “control” observations. 
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OptEx_L = Value of CEO Options Exercised (opt_exer_val) for firm i in year 
t+1/CEO Salary for firm i for year t. 
StockHeld = Log (Value of the CEO stock held in year t/ CEO salary in year t) 
(shrown_excl_opt*split-adjusted price*stock_unvest)/Salary 
EM = Quartile of earnings management, 1 = lowest quartile of discretionary 
accruals, 5 = highest quartile of discretionary accruals 
TA = Total accruals (difference between quarterly income and cash flow) 
(ibcy-oancfy) 
A = Total assets (atq) 
ΔREV = Change in revenue (saleq-saleq-4) 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment (ppegtq) 
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